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Abstract
The differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol is of high interest due to
its relatively simple practical implementation. This protocol uses trains of coherent pulses
and allows the legitimate users to resist individual attacks. In this paper, a new attack on
this protocol is proposed which is based on the idea of information extraction from the part
of each coherent state and then making decision about blocking the rest part depending on
the amount of extracted information.
Introduction
One of the most important problems of cryptography is the secure key distribution, i.e. an
exchange of secrete key between two legitimate users (typically called as Alice and Bob). The
practical implementation of the secure key distribution would make possible information-
theoretic secure communications by using one-time-pad cipher. In 1984 the first quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 was proposed [1]. Unlike classical cryptography, QKD
does not use any assumptions about the computational power of an eavesdropper (called
as Eve). Eve can perform any actions, except of those which are not allowed by quantum
mechanics like discriminating between two non-orthogonal states (see for example [2, 3]).
Thus, the security of QKD is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics.
There are several schemes for QKD introduced so far and for some of them the security
proofs are known. For instance, full proofs of the security for BB84 protocol were given
in [4]. QKD protocols with pseudorandom bases were analyzed in [5]. But practical imple-
mentation of QKD protocols faces some problems connected with impossibility or difficulty
to meet conditions of actual security proven QKD protocols. For example, the detectors used
by the receiver are not ideal. Additionally, the real communication channel looses some sig-
nals and in combination with the fact that usually the emitted signals are weak coherent
pulses, it imposes some restrictions on exploitation of QKD protocols. For instance, the
use of weak coherent pulses makes the protocol vulnerable to such new attacks like photon
number splitting (PNS) attack [6] or unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [7]. In
these attacks Eve in principle can first obtain full information about some part of the key
without causing any disturbance and then block the rest of the signals. In the case of long
distances between Alice and Bob, the losses in the communication channel become so high
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that blocking part of the signals in these attacks causes no extra losses, and protocols can
not provide secret key any more. Practical issues in decoy-state quantum key distribution
were studied [8].
There exist various QKD protocols that promise higher key rate over longer distances and
robustness against attacks like PNS and USD. One of these protocols is the differential phase
shift (DPS) protocol [9], which is in addition relatively easy for practical implementation. In
this protocol the relative phase between the adjacent pulses is used to encode the bit value
of the key. Specially, DPS uses the train of coherent pulses and information is encoded in
the phase difference between any two subsequent pulses. The receiver uses the delayed arm
Mach-Zehnder interferometer to superpose adjacent pulses and in dependence on their phase
difference he obtains bit value either zero or one. The described encoding does not allow
Eve to block one of the pulses in the case of failed measurement, since such blocking causes
high error rate at Bob side. Thus this protocol is robust to attacks on single transmitted
states.
There are several versions of the DPS protocol. Here we consider the one for which the
security has been proven [10, 11]. We propose a new attack on this version of the protocol
whose idea is based on soft filtering operation [12, 13] together with proposed earlier active
beam splitting attack [14]. Eve takes a part of the states, performs information extraction at
every position in the train and then makes a decision, whether to send the rest of the states
to Bob or to block it. Such a scenario allows Eve to make a decision, but it does not spoil the
states that reach Bob in the case if some of Eve’s operations are failed. The unambiguous
state discrimination operation can be considered as a special case of soft filtering. Therefore
the proposed attack should be at least as good as the USD attack.
We use two assumptions: (a) global phase is known to Eve, and (b) Eve can substitute
the original channel between Alice and Bob by a lossless channel. These are the common
assumptions for attacks on the DPS protocol [15, 16]). Let us note that security proofs
given in [10, 11] assume that the global phase is not known to Eve. The motivation for this
research is to provide a new upper bound for the DPS security under the assumptions listed
above, and to design a universal attack scheme which can be effective for both short and
long communication distances, since soft filtering operation has in general a higher success
probability than unambiguous state discrimination.
Using the above two assumptions, we derive the expression for Eve’s information. This
expression is then subject to optimization over the parameters which characterize Eve’s
attack. The criteria for the parameters realizing maximum of Eve’s information are found
by using analytical and numerical methods. Optimization of properties of quantum systems
is related to general field of quantum control [17], that can have applications in quantum
information technologies, creation of quantum correlations, evolution of a particle on a torus,
using non-classical light, etc. [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 1 we briefly describe the protocol and principles
of its operation. In Sec. 2 the details of the proposed attack are presented. Also, we derive
the expressions for the information obtained by Eve about the secret key. Finally, in Sec. 3
the quantum bit error rate and the secret key rate are calculated.
1 Protocol description and notations
Let us give a brief description of the DPS protocol. Its schematics is shown on Fig. 1. For
details, see [11].
Alice emits trains of coherent pulses of length N , where N ≥ 3 and is typically about
10. Bob uses a delay interferometer with two 50:50 beam splitters and with delay that is
equal to the interval between two subsequent pulses. After the interferometer Bob uses two
detectors which detect bit values 0 and 1, respectively. The train of N pulses encodes N −1
logical bits. Alice uses random phase ϕ for the first pulse of the train, and then her phase
modulator randomly sets the relative phase of each pulse either to 0 or pi, where phase 0
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Figure 1: Schematic setup of the DPS protocol. Alice produces a train of N coherent states.
Then, by using the phase modulator (PM) she transforms her states to the row string s. Bob uses
Mach-Zehnder interferometer to obtain its bit values. Here BS1 and BS2 denote beam-splitters
of the interferometer and M1 and M2 denote its mirrors. Signals of the detectors D0 and D1
correspond to bit values 0 and 1, accordingly.
corresponds to 0 bit value and phase pi corresponds to 1. In the sequel, we will set global
phase ϕ to zero and we will denote the signal states as | ± α〉, where α > 0 and µA = α2 is
the intensity of the Alice’s state |α〉. As an example, the train of five coherent states
|α〉|α〉| − α〉|α〉|α〉
corresponds to sending the bit string 0110.
With such a distributed encoding, the common individual attacks are not effective for
the eavesdropper. If Eve obtains an error discriminating states |α〉 and | −α〉 and sends the
incorrect state to Bob, he is likely to get two errors in the two subsequent pulses. Hence the
bit error rate increases. If Eve tries to perform unambiguous state discrimination on every
state, she still cannot block the state at position with inconclusive result, because vacuum
state can also produce errors at two positions after the interferometer.
Alice and Bob use an optical fiber which in the absence of Eve transforms the coherent
input state of intensity µA = α2 to the coherent state with the same phase and a lower
intensity µB,
µB = µA · 10−δ·l/10. (1)
Here l is the channel’s length in kilometers and δ is the attenuation parameter. In the
numerical analysis below we will consider a typical experimental value δ = 0.2 dB/km.
We consider the protocol version [11] where Alice and Bob do expect the states of low
intensity and thus low probability of detector click. They consider as conclusive only mes-
sages with only one detector click in one of N − 1 central positions (with vacuum detected
on the edges). Otherwise they do block the entire train of pulses. It can be considered as a
countermeasure against the attack when Eve sends the states of high intensity if she obtains
a lot of information from the block, giving a lot of detector clicks in the positions convenient
for her.
The protocol is described by the following steps.
• For M times Alice and Bob repeat the following actions:
– Alice generates a random string S = s1, . . . , sN , where sk ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, . . . , N .
– Alice creates a train of N sequential weak coherent states
|S〉 =
N⊗
k=1
|(−1)skα〉k
and sends it to Bob.
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Figure 2: Schematic picture of active beam-splitter attack. The Alice’s signal of intensity µA
comes to the beam-splitter (BS). Eve performs soft filtering operation (SF) on a part of the signal
transmitted through BS. Depending on the number of successes k of SF she either sends to Bob
states of intensity µBk or blocks the entire train of states. At the end, she performs a collective
measurement to extract maximum information from her states.
– Bob performs interference measurement of the incoming train of coherent pulses.
With probability 1 − e−µB he should obtain a conclusive outcome. Bob consider
only events where he detects vacuum in all but one time slots. He notes the
detected bit value and announces the time slot j where he obtains unambiguous
outcome over an authenticated public channel.
– Alice generates her raw key bit as sj+1 ⊕ sj , where j = 1, . . . , N − 1.
• Bob checks the number of conclusive outcomes. If its rate is less than 1− e−µB , then
the legitimate users abort the protocol.
• Alice and Bob correct errors in sifted key.
• Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification.
2 Active beam splitting attack
Let us design an attack where Eve performs her action on the entire train of coherent pulses.
She will sometimes block the entire train and sometimes send a part of original states to
Bob via a noiseless channel. Eve should make sure that Bob obtains conclusive results at
the same rate as he expects after a lossy fiber channel of the given length.
The scheme of the attack is presented on Fig. 2. It is assumed that Eve is located close
to Alice and can insert a lossless channel between her and Bob to send him states without
any losses not caused by her beam splitter and blocking decision.
Performing this attack, Eve does divide each state emitted by Alice on her beam splitter
into two parts. One has intensity tµA and is used by Eve for information extraction. The
other has intensity (1− t)µA and is used for sending to Bob if Eve decides not to block the
states. The decision about either blocking or sending the entire train of pulses to Bob is
taken after the extraction of information by Eve — this property explains the name of this
attack.
The operation that Eve performs on her states | ± α˜〉 = | ± √tα〉 to extract information
is called soft filtering [12] and has the following Stinespring representation
|α˜〉 → |ψ0〉 = √ps|β〉|s〉+
√
1− ps|0〉|f〉,
| − α˜〉 → |ψ1〉 = √ps| − β〉|s〉+
√
1− ps|0〉|f〉, (2)
where state |s〉 indicates the successful filtering, state |f〉 indicates failed filtering, 〈s|f〉 = 0,
and ps is the success probability. By the unitarity condition the success probability equals
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to
ps =
1− 〈α˜| − α˜〉
1− 〈β| − β〉 =
1− e−2tµA
1− fpe−2tµA
, (3)
where the filtering parameter fp = e
2(tµA−|β|2) ∈ [0, 1] is introduced. The filtering parameter
equals to zero for unambiguous discrimination of the input states (orthogonal output states
| ± β〉 of infinite intensity; success probability is then 1− 〈α˜| − α˜〉), and it equals to one for
“doing nothing”, when output states are the same as input states and success probability
is 1. For the values between 0 and 1, this operation increases the distinguishability of the
input states (since 〈β| − β〉 < 〈α˜| − α˜〉) with success probability higher than the one for
unambiguous state discrimination. Eve knows whether this transformation was successful or
not measuring state of her ancilla, |s〉 for the successful filtering, and |f〉 for failed filtering.
After successful soft filtering an optimal collective measurement can be performed to
extract maximum information from the output states.
Active beam splitting attack consists of the following steps:
1. Eve performs soft filtering operation with filtering parameter fp on each of her states
of intensity tµA. This transformation yields a successful outcome with probability ps.
In this case Eve gets a lot of information from the amplified states. Otherwise with
probability 1− ps soft filtering fails and Eve gets no information.
2. If filtering is successful in all positions, Eve in each position has new high intensity
states, and can prepare a new high intensity train of coherent pulses for Bob. But there
is not always need in it. If the number of successful filtering operations was sufficiently
large, Eve sends to Bob states of intensity not higher than (1− t)µA (which remained
after the beam splitter). Starting with some number of failed filtering results in the
block, Eve blocks the entire train, since she can extract too little information from it.
Eve’s decision on whether to block or not to block a train with a given number of failed
filtering operations is based on the requirement that the detection rate of Bob’s detectors
must be the same as expected without Eve.
If N states of intensity µB do reach Bob without any noise, after the interferometer
they are transformed to four states of intensity µB/4 on the edges, and 2(N − 1) states in
the center, which intensity at each position is whether µB or 0. The protocol requires one
detector click in one of the N − 1 central positions which has the probability
(N − 1)e−(N−2)µB (1− e−µB )
and no clicks for the four states on the edges, which probability is (e−µB/4)4. Thus, the
probability that Bob has conclusive outcome in this case is given by
pµB ,N = (N − 1)e−(N−1)µ
B
(1− e−µB ). (4)
If Eve performs her attack, the value of intensity µBk of signal sending to Bob from Eve
in general depends on the number of successful filtering outcomes k, but is the same for
every state within the train of pulses. Thus Bob can get the train of pulses of intensity
µBk with corresponding probability pk. The probability of blocking the entire train is then
1 −∑k≥K pk, where K is the threshold number of successful filtering outcomes: if k < K,
Eve blocks the entire train. Then, conclusive outcome probability at Bob side in given by
pBconc,N =
∑
k≥K
pkpµBk ,N
. (5)
Eve must then choose the values of K and µBk so that (5) is the same as for the expected
intensity (1), i.e. it must be equal to (see (4)) pµB ,N .
Let us give a more detailed description of Eve’s actions.
If Eve receives no failed filtering outcomes, then a train of high intensity (higher, than
the original intensity (1− t)µA) can be sent. If the total share of such trains allows Eve to
5
compensate the loss of intensity from blocking other trains, then Eve leaves only them, and
the attack gives Eve a lot of information But this is possible only for a large attenuation in
the communication channel, that is, for channels of long length. If the length of the channel
is such that using only high intensity trains is not enough to compensate the losses, then
Eve is forced to send other trains as well, where she did not obtain all the successful filtering
outcomes. Then Eve also sends the trains where she obtained one failed filtering result.
If the probability of Bob’s conclusive result, taking into account the sent trains of high
intensity coherent pulses and trains with one Eve’s failed filtering, is exactly the same as
expected, then Eve leaves only such trains and blocks all trains with a larger number of
failed filtering results. However, it can also happen that the probability of Bob’s conclusive
outcome after getting the trains of these two types will be higher than expected. In this
case, Eve artificially reduces the intensity of the trains with one failed filtering, since her
task is eavesdropping with maximum of her information. Eve does this by taking at one
more beam splitter other small part of the state from which she can also extract information.
These actions can be easily generalized: in the general case, Eve blocks all trains with
the number of successful filtering operations less than K, reduces the intensity of trains
with exactly K successes to µBk ≤ (1− t)µA, sends trains of the intensity (1− t)µA with the
number of successes from K+1 to N−1, and sends trains of higher intensity µBN ≥ (1−t)µA
where filtering succeeded at every position.
After soft filtering Eve performs optimal measurement. Therefore Eve information per
one position after obtaining k successful filtering results out of N can be estimated as
IAEk ≥
kχ(|β〉, | − β〉)− 1
N − 1 =
1
N − 1
{
k · h2
(
1− fpe−2tµA
2
)
− 1
}
, (6)
where h2(x) = −x log x− (1−x) log (1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function and the
information that Eve can extract from a single position after successful filtering is given by
Holevo value [3] of states | ± β〉:
χ(|β〉, | − β〉) = h2
(
1− 〈β| − β〉
2
)
= h2
(
1− fpe−2tµA
2
)
.
In (6) Eve gets information from the states | ± β〉 at k positions, and at most one bit of
information is lost due to distributed encoding by Alice and Bob.
3 The parameters of the attack and Eve’s informa-
tion
Let us describe the set of parameters which do characterize the attack.
The first parameter is the part of the state t taken at the beam splitter. For Bob’s
conclusive probability (4) there is the optimal value of µB, where this probability reaches
the maximum. Let us denote this optimal value as µ˜B. When Eve takes the part of the
state, she should not send to Bob the part of intensity higher than µ˜B, because in this case
Bob’s conclusive probability becomes lower. Thus t takes values in [max{0, 1− µ˜B/µA}, 1].
It is easy to see that for short channel lengths, Eve can not take most of the state and
hence the parameter t has to be relatively small. For a long channel length and large losses
expected by legitimate users, the large values of t close to 1 are optimal. Also, t can take
the value 1. In this case Eve performs filtering over all the states and then sends to Bob a
part of her amplified signals only if it succeeds at every position.
The second Eve’s parameter is the filtering parameter fp ∈ [0, 1] which corresponds to the
amplification of the output state for filtering operation. As mentioned above, fp = 0 value
corresponds to unambiguous state discrimination, and fp = 1 corresponds to the output
states remaining the same as the input states.
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The third and fourth parameters p1 and p2 characterize the set of N + 1 intensities {µBk }
(0 ≤ k ≤ N) of the states that are sent to Bob. The first K of them equal zero. The next
intensity µBK takes value from 0 to (1 − t)µA. The following N −K − 1 intensities are all
equal (1 − t)µA. Finally, the intensity µBN can generally be above (1 − t)µA, but usually
it does not make sense to make it very high because it would increase the probability that
Bob gets two or more detector clicks, and hence would reduce the conclusive probability at
Bob’s side.
The parameter p1 ∈ [0, N ] characterizes the threshold number K of successful filtering
results and the intensity of µBK . Integer value of p1 from 0 to N − 1 means that K = p1
and µBK = (1 − t)µA, i.e. Eve blocks all the messages with less than p1 successful filterings
and does not change the intensity of the message with p1 successes. For real value p1 ∈
[K,K + 1] Eve still blocks all the messages with less than K successful filterings and sets
µBK = (K + 1− p1)(1− t)µA.
The parameter p2 ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to the amplification of the intensity µBN . This
intensity should be between the original and optimal values. The parameter value p2 = 0
corresponds to the original value µBN = (1−t)µA, and p2 = 1 corresponds to µBN = min{µA−
1
2 ln fp, µ˜
B}. Here, µA − (ln fp)/2 is the total Eve’s intensity after successful soft filtering
with parameter fp; obviously, µ
B
N can not be larger. By linearity, we have
µBN = (1− t)µA + p2
(
min
{
µA − 1
2
ln fp, µ˜
B
}
− (1− t)µA
)
.
For each set of these three parameters, one can calculate both Eve’s information and the
length of the channel at which an attack with this set of parameters is possible. Similarly,
for each channel length, one can find the optimal set of parameters, which gives maximum
information to Eve.
Eve’s information can be found for every value µBi of intensity for Bob’s states, and
then one can calculate total Eve’s information by taking its mean value with respect to the
corresponding conclusive probabilities at Bob’s side. The first K parameters obviously do
not contribute to Eve’s information, since Bob does not obtain a conclusive outcome in this
case.
The intensity µBK , if it is less than (1− t)µA, gives Eve information from additional part
of the states originally intended for Bob. So in the case of successful filtering, Eve’s intensity
increases and becomes µEK,1 = −12 ln(fpe−2tµ
A
) + (1 − t)µA − µBK . In the case of failure it
equals µEK,2 = (1− t)µA − µBK . Eve’s information is then
IAEK =
1
N − 1
{
Kh2
(
1− fpe−2(µA−µBK)
2
)
+ (N −K)h2
(
1− e−2[(1−t)µA−µBK ]
2
)
− 1
}
.
Actually, IAEK is the lower bound of Eve’s information in the case k = K.
For the intensities µk between K + 1 and N − 1 Eve’s information lower bound similarly
to (6) equals
IAEk =
kh2(
1
2(1− fpe−2tµ
A
))− 1
N − 1 .
For the µBN intensity Eve can give a part of the state to Bob, and her information therefore
can decrease. Her intensity after the filtering then equals µEN = −12 ln(fpe−2tµ
A
)+(1−t)µA−
µBN , and her information lower bound is
IAEN =
Nh2(
1
2(1− fpe−2(µ
A−µBN )))− 1
N − 1 .
As a result, for a set of intensities {µBk } with corresponding Eve’s successful filtering
probabilities
pEk = C
k
Np
k
s(1− ps)N−k
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taking into account the probability (4) of obtaining conclusive result by Bob, one has
IAE =
N∑
k=K
pEk pµBk ,N
IAEk
N∑
k=K
pEk pµBk ,N
.
This information lower bound can be calculated for each set of parameters, and Eve’s goal
is to find the optimal parameters for each channel length.
To simplify this computational task, let us derive an analytical relation on the parameters
which provide an extrema of the information
IAE(t, fp, µ
B
K , µ
B
N ) =
N∑
k=K
ZkI
AE
k
N∑
k=K
Zk
,
where we denote
Zk = Zk(t, fp, µ
B
K , µ
B
N ) = C
k
N (N − 1)pks(1− ps)N−ke−Nµ
B
k (eµ
B
k − 1)
and for simplicity consider the intensities µBK and µ
B
N instead of corresponding parameters
p1 and p2.
Maximum of IAE can be either on the boundary of the set of all admissible values of the
parameters (t, fp, µ
B
K , µ
B
N ), or inside of this set. In the latter case derivatives of I
AE with
respect to each variable should be equal to zero. The derivatives over fp and t give rather
complicated equations and we do not write them here. However, setting to zero derivatives
over µBK and µ
B
N leads to a relatively simple relation for the optimal parameters.
First let us set to zero the derivative with respect to µBK . Note that only ZK and I
AE
K
depend on µBK . Therefore
∂IAE
∂µBK
= 0
⇒ 0 =
(
∂µBK
ZKI
AE
K + ZK∂µBK
IK
) N∑
l=K
Zl − ∂µBKZK
N∑
l=K
ZlI
AE
l
⇒ 0 =
(
∂µBK
ZKI
AE
K + ZK∂µBK
IK − ∂µBKZKI
AE
) N∑
l=K
Zl
⇒ IAE = IAEK + ZK
∂µBK
IAEK
∂µBK
ZK
(7)
where we take into account that
N∑
l=K
Zl > 0.
Similarly setting to zero the derivative with respect to µBN and noting that only ZN and
IAEN depend on µ
B
N , we get
∂IAE
∂µBN
= 0⇒ IAE = IAEN + ZN
∂µBN
IAEN
∂µBN
ZN
. (8)
Comparing (7) and (8) we get that optimal parameters should satisfy the equality
IAEK + ZK
∂µBK
IAEK
∂µBK
ZK
= IAEN + ZN
∂µBN
IAEN
∂µBN
ZN
. (9)
8
The derivatives appearing in (9) can be easily computed as
∂µBK
IAEK = −
K
N − 1fpe
−2(µA−µBK) log
1 + fpe
−2(µA−µBK)
1− fpe−2(µA−µBK)
−N −K
N − 1 e
−2((1−t)µA−µBK) log
1 + e−2((1−t)µA−µBK)
1− e−2((1−t)µA−µBK)
, (10)
∂µBK
ZK = C
K
N (N − 1)pKs (1− ps)N−Ke−Nµ
B
K
(
N − (N − 1)eµBK
)
, (11)
∂µBN
IAEN = −
N
N − 1fpe
−2(µA−µBN ) log
1 + fpe
−2(µA−µBN )
1− fpe−2(µA−µBN )
, (12)
∂µBN
ZN = (N − 1)pNs e−Nµ
B
N
(
N − (N − 1)eµBN
)
. (13)
One can also consider the critical error up to which the protocol can provide secret key
distribution, assuming that Eve is applying the considered attack. This is error rate at
which Eve’s information becomes equal to Bob’s one. It is given by
IAE = IAB = 1− h2(Q)
This error can be caused by equipment failures, or can be introduced by Eve so that she
knew more than Bob.
Figure 3 shows critical error for this protocol for Eve using the considered attack and
some of optimal parameter values.
Beside critical error, the secret key rate may be of interest, which depends both on
information gap between Bob and Eve and on conclusive result probability on Bob’s side.
It equals
R = pBconc,N (I
AB − IAE),
and it is possible to calculate the optimal value of the initial Alice’s intensity µA in order to
achieve the maximum secret key rate under the assumption that Eve applies the considered
attack.
Figure 4 shows the optimal value of µA for versus length of the channel (in km).
4 Conclusions
We have designed an attack which can be considered as a generalization of both unambiguous
state discrimination and beam splitting attacks. As in beam splitting attack, Eve uses a
beam splitter to take a part of each state and then to send the rest of the state to Bob.
Like in the USD attack, Eve performs information extraction and then makes a decision
whether the message should be blocked or not. The operation of information extraction
(soft filtering) is a generalization of unambiguous state discrimination: it makes easier to
extract information from the states with some non-zero success probability.
The DPS protocol uses trains of pulses, and to have all the information about the sates
Eve should have successful results of her information extraction at every position. Never-
theless, the scheme of active beam splitting attack allows Eve to send the unchanged states
to Bob in the case when she fails at some positions. This allows Eve to perform this attack
for the situations of little attenuation as well.
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δ = 0.2 dB/km.
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